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T
his June, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a techni-
cal, but important case interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The case–National
Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Morgan2–was a victory
for victims of sexual and other forms of harassment, but a
loss for victims of other forms of illegal workplace discrim-
ination.  The issue was whether incidents of discrimination
that occurred outside the statute of limitations could nev-
ertheless form the basis for a suit pursuant to the “contin-
uing violations” doctrine.  The answer from the Court, in a
decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, was “Yes
and no.”
This case arose out of the longstanding but trou-
bled employment relationship between Abner Morgan, a
black electrician, and Amtrak.  According to Morgan, from
the time he was hired as an Electrician Helper in 1990 until
the time he was fired in 1995, he was subject to a series of
discriminatory acts at the hands of his employer.  Morgan
alleges that he was paid differently, punished unfairly,
denied union representation in disciplinary meetings, and
harassed because of his race.  Amtrak, however, disputes
many of these claims on the merits. 
Amtrak moved for summary judgment on some of
Morgan’s claims based solely on the theory that they were
time-barred (that is, too early to come within the relevant
statute of limitations). The trial court granted the motion
and dismissed all claims occurring prior to May 3, 1994,
300 days before Morgan filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  
The remaining claims went to trial, but a jury
found for Amtrak on all counts. That was not the end of the
case, however, for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the pre-May 3, 1994 claims should not have been dis-
missed in their entirety because they were “sufficiently
related” to those occurring within the limitations period.3
The “Continuing Violations Doctrine”
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the pri-
mary federal statute used to challenge race discrimination
in employment. It requires that complainants first seek
relief from the EEOC, the federal agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the nation’s employment
discrimination laws.4
A charge with the EEOC must be filed within the
“charge-filing period,” which is either 180 or 300 days from
the discriminatory act, depending on whether the state
where the discrimination is alleged has an agency that
shares the work of processing complaints with the EEOC.5
The EEOC then has the opportunity to review the case,
investigate the claims, and decide whether the case has any
merit. If it does, the EEOC will sometimes sue on the
employee’s behalf–or even, if the complaint reveals wide-
spread illegal conduct, on behalf of a class of employees.
No matter what the EEOC’s decision may be, the com-
plainant at some point earns the right to bring a lawsuit in
court.  
The argument that acts outside the charge-filing
period cannot be sued upon is simple: because the statute
of limitations has expired with respect to these incidents, a
plaintiff cannot bring suit based on them.  The argument
that such acts can indeed sometimes be sued upon is based
upon the theory that recurring acts of related discrimina-
tion may form a single unlawful employment practice for
purposes of Title VII. The employer’s discrimination should
thus be actionable—in its entirety—as long as least one of
the isolated acts occurred within the charge-filing period.
This argument constitutes the “continuing violations doc-
trine.”
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan,
the legal status of the continuing violations doctrine had
plagued courts for a decade and produced a split within the
federal courts of appeals. The question that divided the
courts was whether Title VII plaintiffs who make it past the
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EEOC should be able to recover for discriminatory acts that
occurred outside of the relevant limitations period. A lead-
ing treatise variously describes the pre-Morgan caselaw on
this issue as “muddled” and “defy[ing] easy description or
convenient characterization,”6 and describes the Court’s
own prior cases as “impossible to reconcile.”7 A brief
review of relevant cases proves the point.  
Past courts agreed that an isolated act of discrimi-
nation that occurred outside of the charge-filing period was
untimely and could not provide a basis for suit.8 They also
generally agreed that the doctrine of “equitable tolling”
applied, which can extend the limitations period for fair-
ness reasons.9 For example, an employee might be able to
file an untimely suit if the employer made affirmative rep-
resentations that led the employee to miss the charge-filing
deadline, or if the employee mistakenly filed the charge
with the wrong federal agency.
But suppose there is no basis for equitable tolling,
and an employee has been subjected to multiple, related
discriminatory acts, some of which fall within the relevant
time period, and some of which do not. This is a so-called
serial violation, and courts before Morgan disagreed on
whether suit could be brought upon all the acts or only
those that fall within the charge-filing period. This split
turned on a disagreement about when an unlawful employ-
ment practice “occurs.”
When Does An Unlawful Employment
Practice “Occur”?
Some circuit courts, as in the Morgan case, took the posi-
tion that an unlawful practice occurred when the last act in
a series of “sufficiently-related” acts took place. Take, for
example, a case of hostile environment harassment, which,
by its very nature, usually takes place over a period of time
and includes multiple acts. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the harassment plaintiff could sue at any time up until the
date of the last act of harassment plus the limitations peri-
od. This theory, however, was not limited to cases of serial
harassment; it could also be used when an employee was
repeatedly discriminated against in some other way–both
in the past and, more recently, within the limitations period. 
Four federal circuit courts had adopted a more
demanding test.10 Like the Ninth Circuit, they first asked
whether the alleged acts involved the same type of dis-
crimination as the later acts that fell within the proper time
period. But they also asked whether the earlier acts could
fairly be described as “recurring” (if not, the plaintiff could
not sue upon them) and whether the earlier acts were suf-
ficiently “permanent” to trigger the employee’s awareness
of and duty to challenge them (if so, the plaintiff could not
sue upon them on the theory that she should have sued
upon them earlier).
Other circuit courts had adopted a “notice accrual”
approach to the problem.11 Under this approach, a plaintiff
could only sue for acts outside of the limitations period if
it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to
file a charge earlier. That might happen if early acts of dis-
crimination were secret (a racist comment in a review the
employee was not allowed to read, for example). It might
also happen if the plaintiff reasonably thought that, early
on in course of harassment, she could not yet sue because
a hostile environment had not yet been created.
Meanwhile, other federal courts permitted prior acts to be
used as background evidence, so that a jury would hear
about them, but did not permit them to be used by the jury
in calculating damages.12
When Abner Morgan went before the Supreme
Court, he argued that the Ninth Circuit got it right—that
prior acts can be the basis of an award of damages so long
as they are sufficiently related to at least one act occurring
during the charge-filing period. Amtrak, on the other hand,
argued for the more restrictive notice accrual approach
described above.  And, oddly enough, the United States
went even further in supporting the employer’s position—
arguing, apparently, that there are simply no circumstances
under which an employee ought to be able to recover for
discriminatory acts occurring outside of the charge-filing
period. This extreme position differed from that of the
EEOC, thus putting President Bush’s Solicitor General in
direct conflict with an executive branch agency.  
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The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
Faced with so many competing approaches, the
Supreme Court struck a compromise. The majority first dif-
ferentiated between discrete acts of discrimination (like a
discriminatory failure-to-promote or firing) and hostile
environment harassment, and then adopted a different rule
for each.
With respect to the former category, the Court
held—unanimously—that each act constitutes an “unlaw-
ful employment practice” that occurs at the time the act is
taken.  The charge-filing period begins with the conclusion
of each such act—but only applies to the triggering act
itself. The Court thus refused to recognize the continuing
violations doctrine for discrete acts, regardless of whether
the act or a similar act subsequently recurs.13 The similari-
ty among discrete acts, the Court held, does not convert
them into a single unlawful employment practice, nor does
it enable a plaintiff to combine untimely and timely acts for
purposes of a lawsuit. The Supreme Court thus reversed
the Ninth Circuit on this point. (The Court did acknowl-
edge, however, that untimely acts may be used as back-
ground evidence to support a claim based on timely acts,14
and that equitable doctrines like tolling or estoppel could
be invoked to extend or shorten the charge-filing period.15)
The Court also left open two questions not directly
raised by the facts in Morgan, and upon which lower feder-
al courts may continue to disagree.  First, it did not resolve
whether the doctrine might apply to “pattern and practice”
cases, in which the claim centers on aggregating various
acts to prove systemic discrimination.16 Second, it did not
address whether the charge-filing period should begin for a
hidden violation when it occurs, or only when the plaintiff
discovers that it has occurred.17
For hostile environment harassment, a majority of
the Supreme Court took a different approach. In a part of
the opinion garnering only five votes, the Court recognized
that the nature of a hostile environment claim is that a
series of different acts, some very minor, can combine to
create an unlawful employment practice for Title VII pur-
poses. The illegal practice occurs when the combined acts
become sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment by creating a hostile, offensive, or
abusive working environment. For such a practice, the
Court held that a victim may sue for the entire period of the
hostile environment, as long as a single act contributing to
the claim occurred during the charge filing period.18 This is
true even though a hostile environment may become
actionable long before the last act of harassment occurs. As
long as the harassment continues, the charge-filing period
is pushed back by each subsequent act.19
Dissenters criticized the majority opinion as both
too lenient and too harsh. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor and Breyer would have reached the
question of hidden violations, at least to clarify that some
form of notice rule should be used to determine when dis-
crimination occurs.20 This further step would have given
more rights to victims than the majority did.  
But four members of the Court (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy)
would have rejected the continuing violations doctrine in
cases of harassment as well as discrete acts of discrimina-
tion.21 These dissenters would treat each act of harassment,
whether itself sufficient to create a hostile environment or
not, as a form of discrimination that “occurs.” At the time
suit is brought, only those occurrences within the charge-
filing period could form the basis for a hostile environment
claim.  This approach, the dissenters argued, is justified by
the unfairness an employer would face trying to defend
itself against, for example, a suit alleging a hostile environ-
ment over a ten-year period.22
Did Any Justice Get it Right? 
In the end, no Justice endorsed a position as broad-
ranging as the Ninth Circuit’s, while only two endorsed the
extremely restrictive approach advocated by the govern-
ment. The approach taken by the majority is very much a
compromise that preserves some important rights for vic-
tims of harassment while depriving victims of other forms
of discrimination of similar protection.  
The approach taken in the majority and dissenting
opinions are, however, both vulnerable to criticism.  The
majority’s refusal to recognize the continuing violations
doctrine in non-harassment cases (a position shared by the
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dissenters as well) is hard to justify. There are already lim-
its in the law that effectively prevent most employers from
being faced with a damage award based upon discrimina-
tion that took place long ago. Title VII, for example, limits
awards of back pay to two years, no matter how long the
discrimination has been occurring.
The dissenters’ concern about stale harassment
claims is a straw man. In sexual harassment law, employer
liability is inherently limited by the affirmative defense the
Court created four years ago, which protects employers
when they have taken adequate measures to prevent and
correct harassment and the victim has taken too long to
complain.23 Thus a “good” employer–one that properly
adopted an effective harassment policy and complaint sys-
tem–will be exonerated in a case where the victim waits
more than a few months to complain. The only employer
protected by the extreme position advocated by the dis-
senters is the “bad” employer who sits back and does noth-
ing while harassment recurs, and then objects to being held
liable for the more dated acts. Such an employer does not
deserve statute of limitations protection, for it could have
addressed the harassment itself long ago; having allowed a
lengthy course of harassment to occur, that employer
should not later be heard to complain that the course of
harassment alleged is too lengthy.
In the end, not a single justice was willing to
acknowledge this basic truth: a pattern is still a pattern,
even if it does not constitute a hostile environment.
Employers who continue to engage in repeated acts of dis-
crimination should not benefit from a statute of limitations
designed to give closure to acts that are long since over and
done with. Their pattern is not over, and neither should
their exposure to lawsuits be. Nevertheless, the case is at
least a partial victory, one that will benefit “hostile envi-
ronment” plaintiffs, although it should have been a victory
for other discrimination plaintiffs as well.
____________________
Joanna L. Grossman is an Associate Professor at Hofstra Law
School.
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